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THE LIMITS OF DELIBERATION ABOUT THE
PUBLIC’S VALUES
Mark Seidenfeld*
THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
DEMOCRACY. By Blake Emerson. New York: Oxford University
Press. 2019. Pp. xii, 276. $90.
INTRODUCTION
In The Public’s Law: Origins and Architecture of Progressive Democracy,
Blake Emerson 1 provides a new intellectual history of the administrative
state and uses this history to develop a justification for it. Emerson’s project
revolves around the work of American Progressive thinkers, especially as
they were influenced by the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. 2 Emerson
plumbs the Hegelian roots of these various Progressives’ understanding of
the state to suggest how the administrative state of today can best be struc-
tured to implement democratic governance that reflects Hegel’s belief that
the state should foster freedom via rational deliberative processes. 3
At the outset, I must confess that I am enamored of efforts to justify and
improve the current administrative apparatus of the United States. I myself
have engaged in that enterprise. 4 Although I am skeptical that any coherent
theoretical justification will ever be free from objections, 5 such endeavors are
useful to identify shortcomings in the structure of the administrative state
* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University College
of Law. Thanks to my colleague Rob Atkinson, without whose help I would have found Hegel’s
philosophy impenetrable.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. [Editor’s note: Professor Emerson
offers a response to Professor Seidenfeld at Blake Emerson, The Values of the Administrative
State: A Reply to Seidenfeld, 119 Mich. L. Rev. Online 61 (2021).]
2. I am a scholar of neither Hegel’s philosophy nor the works of American Progres-
sives. Hence, in this Review I accept Emerson’s description of the philosophies of these think-
ers. My Review focuses instead on a critique of Emerson’s use of these philosophies as they are
described in The Public’s Law.
3 . See pp. 11–12.
4 . See, e .g ., Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Admin-
istrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Role of Politics];
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification].
5 . See Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest for a “Unified” Theory of the Administrative
State ., 5 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 1, 2005, at 1, 14–15, https://doi.org/10.2202/1539-
8323.1056 [https://perma.cc/3L4F-XGGU].
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and the administrative law doctrines that govern it. Often those shortcom-
ings stem from attempts to implement previously accepted justifications for
the administrative state, and questioning those prior justifications is there-
fore an important means to update administrative law to reflect acceptable
bases for legitimating American bureaucracy.
In The Public’s Law Emerson presents some inviting, albeit provocative,
ideas about the appropriate role of the bureaucracy in our democracy. That
said, overall the book did not live up to my initial expectations. Specifically,
Emerson seems to harbor an unrealistic notion of the capacity for the public
to engage in deliberation about abstract values. Perhaps more disappointing-
ly, Emerson’s attempt to modify administrative law to bring democratic val-
ues to Hegel’s political philosophy is spelled out only with the broadest of
brush strokes. Thus, my initial enthusiasm that The Public’s Law would lead
to concrete suggestions about how administrative law might be structured to
deliver the Progressive democracy that Emerson desires proved overly opti-
mistic.
To best develop my critique of The Public’s Law, it is helpful to first
summarize Emerson’s view of the Hegelian theory of the state, and the at-
tempts of various thinkers to borrow from that philosophy to build a Pro-
gressive democratic state. Following this description, I lay out Emerson’s
vision for a Progressive administrative state. Finally, I explain why I am un-
persuaded by Emerson’s vision for restructuring our understanding of the
administrative state and the administrative law that governs it, suggesting
along the way legal doctrines that I think would better serve the goals of Em-
erson’s Progressive vision.
I. HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE STATE
According to Emerson, Hegel understood “the modern state as an ethi-
cal community committed to the norm of individual freedom” (p. 25). For
Hegel, freedom entailed a life of “self-determination, the process of the hu-
man will ‘giving itself content.’ ” 6 But the content of human will was not
simply the autonomy to pursue one’s individual preferences. Rather, because
people are social beings, it required a society in which “individuals form
bonds of solidarity on the basis of their common interests” (p. 26). The state
was necessary because “[w]hen individuals are subjected to powerful and an-
tagonistic social forces that cannot be understood, engaged, or countered by
means of property and contract, their self-determination requires a public
authority that implements their shared interests and redresses their collective
harms” (p. 30).
Therefore, the state had an obligation to promote freedom, and this ob-
ligation was composed of two components. The state had to ensure that each
6. P. 25 (quoting GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ENZYKLOPÄDIE DER
PHILOSOPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN IM GRUNDRISSE (1830): DRITTER TEIL; DIE PHILOSOPHIE
DES GEISTES § 469, at 288 (Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel eds., Suhrkamp 1970)
(1830) (Emerson’s translation)).
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person had what Emerson terms the “requisites” to live freely (p. 65). Essen-
tially the state was to guarantee each person sufficient resources to allow
them to participate in society by exercise of their dominion over property
and by entering into contractual relationships. But also the state had an obli-
gation to promote the society that allowed individuals to “relate their own
isolated actions and interests to those of similarly situated persons and to act
with them to achieve shared purposes” (p. 26). Thus, the state was responsi-
ble for facilitating the creation of a society that reflected people’s shared
communal interests.
For Hegel, the state was to fulfill its dual obligations by creating law,
which Hegel indicated is done in two ways. Statutes enacted by the legisla-
ture reflected universal law, which was binding on those who implemented
the law. But equally important was the translation of the universal into the
particular. What today we would call administration was responsible for “ar-
bitrat[ing] ‘the conflict between private interests and particular concerns of
the community, and between both of these together and the higher view-
points and ordinances of the state.’ ” 7 Thus the executive was responsible for
regulating to protect the public’s rights to freedom both in terms of provi-
sion of requisites and maintenance of a society that reflects the public’s
common interest (p. 30). As Emerson summarizes Hegel’s notion of law:
“Legislation . . . must have some determinacy in order to retain its status as a
norm that guides state action. But it must leave sufficient room for adminis-
trative adaptation in order to retain its generality and uniformity over time
and across various realms of application” (p. 29).
Hegel posited that government bureaucracy was the proper institution
to translate the universal to meet particular circumstances in a manner that,
by focusing on the public good, would still be universal in nature (p. 32).
Hegel recognized two particular attributes of administrators that render
them especially well suited to this task. First, Hegel believed that rational
thought and deliberation were crucial to translating statutory universal law
into particular regulatory rules. Hegel thought public officials were educated
in the process of discourse and deliberation as well as in training in the par-
ticulars of their fields, which would predispose them to utilize what Emerson
characterizes as “practical reason that can effectively grapple with the values
at stake” (p. 32). Second, the role of public officials puts them above the
competition of interest groups for their preferred regulatory outcomes. In
essence, they seek to further the common interests that characterize the pub-
lic’s interest. “[D]ealing with matters of common concern has the effect of
educating public officials to think from the perspective of the community as
a whole rather than from the self-interested perspective of market actors”
(p. 31).
7. P. 30 (quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 289A (Al-
len W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820)).
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II. PROGRESSIVE ATTEMPTS TO DEMOCRATIZE HEGEL’S ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE
Progressive scholars and politicians were responsible for creating much
of the foundation for the current federal administrative state beginning just
after Reconstruction and culminating in President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt’s New Deal. 8 Emerson notes that many of the Progressive thinkers had
studied and were significantly influenced by Hegel’s political philosophy
(pp. 61–62). According to Emerson, however, American Progressives did not
merely adopt Hegel. The Public’s Law shows that these thinkers democra-
tized Hegel’s thinking in the course of borrowing from it (p. 19).
By tracing this lineage, Emerson attempts to rehabilitate Hegel’s influ-
ence on the origins of administrative law. Rather than “odious” and “un-
American,” as conservative critics have argued, the Progressives recast He-
gel’s theory in a democratic mold more fitting with the United States Consti-
tution. 9 Emerson’s history also shows that “[t]he usual story, that
participatory forms of administration were latecomers to American public
law, is . . . myopic” (p. 66). A vision of a democratic administrative state in
fact dates to the earliest American thinking about the bureaucracy (p. 2).
A major conundrum for Progressives, working in the shadow of Hegel,
was that the United States Constitution clearly located national sovereignty
in “the people” and provided mechanisms for democratic input to influence,
if not necessarily control, the operation of government. 10 But Hegel’s theory
of the state located sovereignty in the monarch and was anything but demo-
cratic. 11 Hegel was skeptical of public opinion as the foundation for law-
defining societal norms. As Emerson summarizes Hegel’s view, “public opin-
ions . . . arise from experience within civil society [that] are accidental forms
of knowledge, as likely to lead to error as to truth” (p. 28). In addition, He-
gel’s reliance on the public-spirited nature of government officials suggests
that he would view private individuals, who have personal interests and de-
sires that might not be shared universally, likely as biased on their evaluation
of common interests, which for Hegel were the basis for civil society. For
Hegel, the purpose of political representation in the legislature was “not to
give voice to public opinion, but to educate the people about their common
interests” (p. 28). Through debate, rational deliberation, and the pursuit of
framing laws to reflect generally valid norms, the legislature could channel
public opinion to find “true thoughts and insight” (p. 28; emphasis omitted).
The Public’s Law explores how five Progressive thinkers incorporated
different aspects of Hegel’s theory into a more democratic vision of the ad-
ministrative state. 12 W.E.B. Du Bois, who “would have been familiar with
8 . See pp. 61–112.
9 . See p. 62.
10 . See p. 115.
11 . See p. 24.
12 . See p. 64.
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[Hegel’s] statist perspective on liberty from his study at Humboldt Universi-
ty in Berlin,” focused on the state’s obligation to provide the requisites for
individuals to live free lives in society (p. 68). In a democracy, such equality
would require that African Americans be empowered to participate as equals
in the American democratic process. Du Bois not only interpreted the Hege-
lian principle that the state should guarantee equal opportunity to apply to
participation in American democracy but also essentially elevated that prin-
ciple over the rule of law and recognition of the society envisioned by public
opinion at the time. 13
Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to democratize Hegel’s administrative state
took precisely the opposite position from that of Du Bois’s. In true Hegelian
fashion, he viewed administration as channeling current social understand-
ings into the implementation of the law (p. 80). Moreover, although he rec-
ognized that the Constitution assigned the responsibility that the law be
faithfully executed to the president, and the president, like Congress, was ac-
countable to the electorate, he did not see the president’s job as controlling
the exercise of administrative discretion. Rather, “Wilson pioneered the ‘rhe-
torical presidency,’ using his speeches to influence legislation and national
public discourse” (p. 83). But, he placed sovereignty solidly in the people
themselves and therefore believed that “the ‘conscience of administration’
must be shaped by public opinion.” 14 Notoriously, in stark contrast to the
Progressive views of Du Bois, Wilson segregated the federal government, es-
sentially elevating the public’s racism over political and social empowerment
of African Americans (p. 72).
Other Progressives avoided the tension between the positions of Du Bois
and Wilson by conceiving of public opinion as something that good admin-
istration needed to cultivate as well as reflect. Early on in his writing, John
Dewey clearly subscribed to the Hegelian notion that “[i]n the realization of
individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community
of persons of which the individual is a member; and conversely, the agent
who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct
satisfies himself.” 15 Dewey later labeled that community as the public, which
in some sense reflected the “collective voice of citizens” (p. 89). But for Dew-
13. Later, during the New Deal, Du Bois would make this focus more explicit. He would
call for “a suspension of ordinary political accountability and judicial process in order to
achieve the egalitarian social conditions under which a future democracy could flourish.” P. 71
(citing W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 219 (Free Press
1998) (1935)).
14. P. 74. Emerson quotes Wilson asserting: “The ideal for us is a civil service cultured
and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the
popular thought, by means of election and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or
class spirit quite out of the question.” Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL.
SCI. Q. 197, 217 (1887).
15. P. 86 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS (1891),
reprinted in 3 JOHN DEWEY, THE EARLY WORKS, 1882–1892, at 237, 322 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.,
1969)).
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ey individuals’ shared values were insufficiently formed to guide administra-
tion. The formation of the public required “free and full discussion[,] which
mean[t], in the case of social problems, the maximum use of the capacities of
citizens for proposing courses of action, for testing them, and for evaluating
the results.” 16
Dewey thus sought to democratize administration by requiring public
officials to seek out the input from those who would be affected by their reg-
ulatory actions, and to take that input into account in evaluating what is in
the public’s interest. As Emerson reports, Dewey posited that “in the absence
of an informed voice on the part of the masses, the wise cease to be wise.”17
He further asserted:
No government by experts in which the masses do not have a chance to in-
form the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy man-
aged in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must proceed in a
way which forces the administrative specialist to take account of the
needs.18
Of particular significance to my evaluation of Emerson’s proposed rein-
vigoration of the Progressives’ Hegelian thought, it is crucial to note that
Dewey did not to envision the general citizenry actually debating regulatory
issues and reaching some resolution that would bind an administrative agen-
cy. In fact, Dewey and his disciples “saw the need for centralized administra-
tive control as arising from the insufficient knowledge and capacity of
individuals to remedy harms” imposed by corporations and other large pri-
vate institutions in their use of their property. 19 Dewey even expected that
providing input about the effects of various private activities that might be
regulated was to done by what today we would call interest groups. “Such
bodies could synthesize individual interests into an organized institutional
apparatus and so enable the state to reconcile and harmonize the conflicting
values within society” (p. 88). Interest groups would help provide feedback
of information and deliberation by administrators into individual’s values
and perceptions of their interests. 20 But even the act of providing infor-
mation was too costly or informationally challenging to expect private indi-
viduals to participate directly in the administrative regulatory function.
Mary Follett, for her part, placed interest groups at the center of her vi-
sion of a democratic administrative state. She advocated for participatory
16. P. 87 (quoting Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1990)).
17 . See p. 169 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 206 (Swallow
Press 1954) (1927)).
18. P. 94 (quoting DEWEY, supra note 17, at 208.)
19. P. 92 (citing JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1927)).
20. P. 88 (noting that the para-state and the administrative apparatus “shared organiza-
tional logics, professional orientations, collective purposes, and subject matter emphases that
facilitated private communication between private persons and officers of the state”).
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democracy more directly premised on individual membership in interest
groups, and the interaction of these groups with the state’s administrative
apparatus. She formulated her theory as a Hegelian response to pluralism,
which viewed the state as providing a forum for interest groups to compete
for desired regulatory outcomes in terms of their political power. 21 Follett
embraced interest groups not as adversaries in a zero-sum competition,
which she feared would eventually lead to domination by particular groups
to the detriment of society as a whole. Rather, Follett viewed the centralized
state, and law, as a means of finding ways to unite the interests of various
groups to create cooperative solutions to social problems. 22 For Follett, ad-
ministrative agencies held the promise of fulfilling this role because they en-
joyed “a certain situational flexibility, which allowed them to restructure
social conflict . . . to produce the possibility of broader forms of public pow-
er” (p. 101). Moreover, administration also strengthened democracy because
it could be structured to require that exercises of regulatory power “arise
from a deliberative interchange between the people—already disaggregated
into groups with internally legitimate power—and the administration.” 23
Frank Goodnow attempted to justify the Progressive administrative state
by locating it within the Constitution’s assignment of the powers of govern-
ment. Goodnow saw “in the Constitution a framework in which administra-
tion might lawfully proceed—governed by statute, specified by the executive
official, and policed by the courts” (p. 104). For Goodnow, the rule of law
required that administration be subordinate to legislation, because the legis-
lature was elected by the people and granted the legislative power by the
Constitution. 24 But the president too was elected by the people, and there-
21. Pp. 96–97. American pluralists in the 1950s supported broad administrative policy-
making discretion because they believed the administrative process encouraged agencies to
reward regulatory outcomes to those groups whose members most value the expected value of
a favorable outcome, which in turn hinged on the number of citizens whose preferences for
regulatory outcomes aligned with the outcome the group advocated and the intensity with
which those citizens valued those outcomes. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 36–39 (1957) (modelling how competition between groups can allocate govern-
ment benefits to those groups that value them most); Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penal-
ties: Why the Public Would Lose Under the “Penalty Default Canon,” 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV
724, 726 (2004) (“Pluralists liken the legislative process to a competitive market that leads to an
equilibrium outcome that maximizes some version of political wealth . . . [that] reflects both
the preferences of each voter and the strengths of those preferences.”).
22. P. 101; see also p. 97–98 (discussing Follett’s notion that the power of interest groups
should be “power-with” rather than “power-over”).
23. P. 99. To this end, Follett suggested that agencies hold “experience meetings” before
regulating. This would allow all stakeholders to interact with each other and with the experts at
the agency. “[T]he experience of the people may change the conclusions of the expert while the
conclusions of the expert are changing the experience of the people . . . .” P. 100 (quoting M. P.
FOLLETT, CREATIVE EXPERIENCE 218 (1924)).
24. “Popular government requires that it is the executing authority which shall be sub-
ordinate to the expressing authority [i.e., legislature], since the latter in the nature of things can
be made much more representative of the people than can executive authority.” P. 105 (quot-
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fore he believed that the Constitution allowed Congress to give the executive
authority to express the will of the state in the details of regulation (p. 106).
Goodnow accepted that the Constitution demanded judicial-type con-
straints on exercises of administrative power that were quasi-judicial in the
sense of applying law to facts in a nonpolitical fashion (pp. 109–10). But he
also recognized that administrative actions involved matters that affected the
public interest and therefore implemented policy choices (p. 109). The need
for judicial-type constraints, however, could be accomplished by insulating
administrative decisionmakers from political pressures, and demanding that
agencies provide sufficient procedure and explanation for their actions
(p. 110). With such protections in place, the appropriate responsibility for
regulatory decisions could constitutionally be left to administrative agencies,
and should be left to them to decide in accordance with the will of the state
rather than allowing judicial countermand that often seemed to reflect judi-
cial rejection of the political will of the nation. 25
III. EMERSON’S PROGRESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Emerson’s intellectual history intimates at his normative vision of the
bureaucracy. But in The Public’s Law’s final chapter, Emerson states his pre-
scriptions directly (p. 151). At the core of Emerson’s vision of the Progres-
sive administrative state lies what he characterizes as a deeply democratic
deliberative government. 26 Emerson argues that a Progressive state has to
engage in “[d]eliberative problem-solving,” requiring “the enactment and
implementation of laws and regulations that are not completely justified ex
ante but rather will help to guide future discussion” (p. 164). Prior to this
passage, Emerson cites Dewey and Follett to suggest that the debate must be
about tangible outcomes not principles (pp. 163–64). But Emerson seems to
require more than that when he states:
When officials consider particular regulatory problems, such as pollution,
labor market discrimination, or financial regulation, they must use their
discretion to rectify asymmetrical social relationships that leave certain so-
cial groups with arbitrary and unaccountable authority over others. . . . The
officialdom should actively institute the general interest by remedying the
maldistribution of power in the existing pattern of social organization.
Administrative policies that reduce inequalities of resources, information,
ing FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT 24
(1900)).
25. Goodnow wrote during the infamous Lochner era, during which courts invoked
property and contract rights to strike down much regulation that reflected the political will at
the time. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (2001) (reporting that “contemporary
critics criticized the judiciary for failing to defer to the majority legislative will, as embodied in
legislative judgments”).
26. For example, Emerson titles a section of his chapter describing his vision of the Pro-
gressive state as “Deepening Democratic Rule-Making.” Pp. 172–76.
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and access to the political process are therefore to be favored over those
that worsen such inequalities or merely perpetuate the status quo. (p. 173)
Emerson thus addresses the tension between Wilson’s fidelity to public
opinion and Du Bois’s focus on enabling those whose contributions to
sculpting society are ignored or irrationally discounted by demanding that
his Progressive state pay attention to both goals while formulating policy
that governs society. Moreover, Emerson demands that administration favor
a focus on ensuring a future deep democracy over satisfaction of current
public preferences and values.
Emerson also demands that public involvement and deliberation occur
at the level where law becomes operational. He criticizes theories of “repub-
lican moments,” which posit that there are unusual times in the history of
the United States when circumstances are extreme enough to induce the pol-
ity to debate societal values, and in the process change our understanding
about the way the Constitution structures government. 27 Provisions of the
Constitution and even statutes, he claims, leave too much of the law unde-
termined and do no good if those who implement the law do not agree with
the people on the details of what the Constitution or statutes mean (pp. 166–
67). Thus, democracy must occur with respect to the day-to-day operation of
law that confronts government administration (pp. 166–67). Thus, con-
sistent with Hegel, who saw government bureaucracy playing a special role
in tying law to the norms of society, Emerson sees the key to a Progressive
state as the operation of administrative agencies, which are responsible for
translating the broad principles of constitutional and statutory law into the
rules that govern particular circumstances. 28
In structuring government to be deeply democratic, Emerson mentions
how the participatory democracy of the Progressives influenced the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment requirements for rulemaking
(pp. 127–28). While Emerson sees this as salutary, again he demands more of
agencies than merely providing opportunities for public comment. To in-
volve everyday people in the deliberative process, “[t]he organizational ad-
vantages of the more powerful must be kept in view, and efforts made to
solicit and foster participation of the groups who are equally affected, but are
prevented by their social condition from full participation in administrative
procedures” (p. 173). In his later discussion of the Obama Administration’s
adoption of the “Clean Power Plan,” Emerson applauds the Environmental
Protection Agency for consulting with states and tribal leaders prior to issu-
ing its notice of proposed rulemaking, and for holding regional public hear-
ings to receive comments on the proposal (p. 202). Thus, he seems to believe
27. P. 166 (rejecting deliberative democracy, advocated by Jürgen Habermas and Bruce
Ackerman, as insufficient to allow the people to govern).
28. P. 168. This is also required by Hegel’s theory of the state, which held the bureaucra-
cy responsible for translating the broad universal laws adopted by the legislature to particular
circumstances, and then adopting narrower universal laws (i.e., regulations) to fit these par-
ticular circumstances. Pp. 31–32.
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that agencies should use something akin to the experience meetings pro-
posed by Follett 29 when adopting controversial rules. Beyond outreach, Em-
erson calls for “[a]gencies [to] experiment with the ‘co-production’ of public
services by beneficiaries, as such persons could participate in designing, im-
plementing, and monitoring welfare programs” (p. 173). More radically,
Emerson suggests that “[a]gencies should . . . be sensitive to differences in
the participatory quality of public interest groups and private associations,
giving greater weight to collective commenters who convey the deliberative
judgment of a large numbers [sic] of citizens” (p. 173).
Emerson is realistic in understanding that the use of the participatory
procedures he has in mind would be very expensive and time consuming.30
He therefore is willing to allow an agency to skip them, and in fact even skip
currently mandated notice-and-comment procedures, to come up with
workable current rules. But he would require that if an agency does skip
these procedures, it does so by issuing what have come to be known as inter-
im final rules, and that the agency commit to remaining open-minded about
changing the interim rule after subsequent deeply democratic procedures
used to evaluate how the interim rule has operated to achieve the dual Hege-
lian goals of reducing the exclusion of those without power from the regula-
tory process and reflecting deliberatively formed public values (pp. 175–76).
Emerson’s views also spring from Goodnow’s attempt to situate the ad-
ministrative state in our constitutional system. Today, agencies create policy
primarily by rulemaking rather than adjudication of particular cases. There-
fore, Emerson expands on Goodnow’s requirement of judicially reviewable
“notice and a hearing, in exchange for judicial deference to administrative
judgements” (p. 176). He relies on Wilson, Dewey, and Follett for the propo-
sition that requiring agencies to engage in an adequate decisionmaking pro-
cess and to give reasons for their decisions “could discipline administrative
action by public opinion, while at the same time articulating social interests
in a more rational form” (p. 176). He thus supports judicial review of agen-
cies’ reasons for exercises of their policymaking discretion.
Emerson, however, finds the current standards of judicial review want-
ing because they focus on technical explanations of agency decisions, which
“are often extremely costly for agencies to offer, beyond courts’ institutional
competency to assess, and inscrutable to any member of the public without a
graduate degree in the relevant subject matter” (pp. 177–78). He claims that
this sort of review is “not deliberative, but rather instrumental,” by which he
appears to suggest that it aims only at efficiency and evaluation of how well
the agency is meeting statutory goals (p. 177). The agency’s “rationality
is . . . judged by means-ends convergence, not by cogent argument concern-
ing the rightness of the ends pursued.” 31 He advocates that agency explana-
29 . See supra note 23.
30 . See p. 175.
31. P. 177 (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 32 (2001)).
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tions for their actions address “[t]he profound value questions [that] these
regulatory actions raise” (p. 179). Demanding such explanations will prevent
agencies from hiding the value judgments that inhere in their actions behind
technocratic justifications.
Having described his conception of a Progressive deeply democratic
administrative state, Emerson turns finally to address the relationship of the
agencies to the president. Emerson alludes to the fact that the Constitution
provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in [the] President,” 32
and that the president has the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” 33 The president also is the sole officer of the United
States who is elected by the people of the entire nation and who lays claim to
a role in the implementation of every regulatory program. Thus, one could
reason, as Goodnow did, that the legitimacy of congressional delegation of
policymaking discretion to the executive branch rested on its supervision by
the president. 34
Emerson, however, resists reliance on this point to view the rise of the
administrative state as necessarily accreting the president’s power (p. 181).
Emerson notes that the policymaking of the executive branch is vastly too
great a task for the president to be able “to achieve full and pervasive control
over administrative decision-making and behavior” (p. 182). More signifi-
cantly, Emerson fears that congressional control over the executive branch
and the necessity of some administrative independence due to the size of the
administrative task means presidents are likely to engage in exercises of arbi-
trary personal power, rather than democratically informed judgment
(pp. 183, 194). This threat has been exacerbated by extreme partisanship
preventing Congress from checking such exercises of the president’s power,
as well as institutionalization of greater White House control over regulatory
decisionmaking (p. 194). For Emerson, the justification for congressional
power to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies is the requirement that
agencies exercise this power to further the implementation of the will of the
people as revealed through a properly deeply democratic and deliberative
process (p. 184). And, once a rule is established, the executive branch, in-
cluding the president, must abide by it unless and until it is either overruled
by statute or changed by the same deliberative process by which it was
adopted. 35
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see p. 181 (noting that under the Constitution, the president
is “ultimately responsible for the execution of the laws” and that “agencies that implement
statutory provisions usually fall under his supervision”).
34 . See pp. 106–07.
35. Thus, Emerson opined that it would be difficult for the Trump Administration to
reverse the Obama Administration Clean Power Plan because any amendment or repeal would
have to go through notice-and-comment proceedings and, upon challenge, be determined to
be adequately reasoned. P. 203.
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IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF EMERSON’S PROGRESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE
One might challenge Emerson’s administrative state by questioning the
Hegelian premise that the purpose of the state is to enable individual free-
dom, where freedom means a person’s capability of living a fulfilling life in a
society that both reflects their personal values and defines who they are as a
social being. I, however, find the Hegelian notion of the purpose of the state
attractive at least insofar as it recognizes that human beings are social ani-
mals who define themselves in large part based on their interactions with
others in their social community. Therefore, in critiquing The Public’s Law, I
will refrain from questioning Hegel’s understanding of the role of the state. I
turn instead to a detailed evaluation of Emerson’s attempt to describe the
structure and processes for implementing such a state consistent with the
democracy laid out in the United States Constitution. I begin by reviewing
the problems of the capacity of the general public to engage in deliberation
about regulation, and how Emerson’s ideas do not alleviate, and in fact
might exacerbate, those problems. I then proceed to describe what I perceive
as a mismatch between the institutional structures envisioned by Emerson
and the role he would ask the institutions of government to play, as well as
the lack of sufficient checks and balances in Emerson’s system to ensure
against the administrative state abusing the power with which Emerson
would invest it.
A. The General Public Is Not Well Suited to Deliberate About Regulations
Certainly Emerson is correct that people may know what outcomes
would help or hurt their interests. But, frequently regulations do not directly
apply to the public. Rather the public is the putative beneficiary of regulation
that restricts those directly regulated from conduct that the agency finds to
undermine the public interest. Even when regulations do directly constrain
the conduct of the general public, people often will not understand the bene-
fits that inure from coordinated action. 36 Thus, for members of the public to
understand whether a regulation is good for them, they need to understand
how the regulation is likely to affect the behavior of those regulated, and how
the changed behavior of those regulated will affect them. Furthermore, usu-
36. For example, individuals ordered to wear masks in public to prevent the spread of
COVID-19 appreciate the discomfort that wearing a mask entails, but many do not accept that
having everyone wear a mask decreases their risk of contracting the disease. See Majority Agree
Masks Have a Role in US Response to COVID-19, PURDUE UNIV. NEWS (July 22, 2020),
https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2020/Q3/majority-agree-masks-have-a-role-in-
us-response-to-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/R4QA-D58R] (reporting that although 83
percent of Americans agree that “masks have a role in the COVID-19 response” only 53 per-
cent believe that wearing a mask helps prevent them from getting the virus, and 64 percent be-
lieve that it helped prevent them from spreading the virus).
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ally when an agency regulates, it considers an array of possible regulations. 37
Hence, in order to deliberate about what regulation to adopt, the public
would have to understand the likely effects of alternative regulations as well.
But the public is notoriously ill informed in general about matters that might
help them understand these effects. 38 Rarely will the public be able to mean-
ingfully suggest alternatives to regulation and know the likely effects of those
alternatives.
One might propose obligating the agency first to analyze the various
possible regulatory actions and identify their likely effect on the public. Hav-
ing done so, the agency could then ask members of the public for input about
which alternative they prefer. I would venture that the real sticking point to
such an approach is not that the agency might fail to understand how vari-
ous segments of the public would react to the outcomes from each regulatory
possibility that the agency analyzes. It is much more likely to be questions
about whether the public accepts that the agency analysis is accurate and
performed in a good-faith manner, without conscious or unconscious bias. 39
In fact, that is precisely what the “hard look” doctrine that Emerson finds
problematically technical is supposed to force the agency to do (pp. 177–78).
In essence, Emerson specifies what agencies should do, but he provides no
systematic structure that ensures that agencies will act in accordance with
Progressive principles.
I can illustrate my point using a rulemaking that Emerson himself relies
on for empirical support that his deeply democratic deliberative process is
good—Obama’s Clean Power Plan. 40 Emerson emphasized that because of
the careful vetting of this rule with members of the public, the Trump Ad-
ministration would find it difficult to rescind the plan (pp. 201–03). But, the
objection of many people opposed to the Clean Power Rule—in particular
Appalachian coal miners—was primarily that it would raise the cost of coal
to prohibitive levels and put many coal miners out of work, a prediction of
37. Under current administrative law principles, an agency has to consider plausible
alternatives to its proposed regulation. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative
Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 878 (2020) (“[J]udicial review is not meaningful without some
kind of reasoned explanation that includes, among other things, . . . deliberation about policy
alternatives.”).
38 . See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 447–48 (2010) (“[T]he American public generally
knows little about even those regulatory initiatives that most directly affect their interests.”);
see also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT
IS SMARTER 1–2 (2d ed. 2016) (claiming generally that the American public is ignorant about
specifics of policy and government).
39. For example, Donald Trump has manipulated outlandish claims that government
bureaucrats are part of a deep-state conspiracy to gain support among his base. See Bobby Al-
lyn, ‘Deep, Dark Conspiracy Theories’ Hound Some Civil Servants in Trump Era, NPR (Nov. 14,
2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/14/779035797/deep-dark-conspiracy-theories-
hound-some-civil-servants-in-trump-era [https://perma.cc/EKJ4-SQZC].
40. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Util-
ity Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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fact that depended on the type of technical analysis to which Emerson ob-
jects. 41 In fact, economists and policy analysts virtually all agree that the im-
pact of the rule on the coal industry would not be great because coal is no
longer economically competitive with other sources of power, most signifi-
cantly natural gas. 42 But the agency appears to have been unable to convince
coal miners of the truth of this “technical” proposition. If those opposed to
the rule understood this technical detail, they would have realized that their
efforts would have been better spent petitioning Congress and the White
House to commit to investing some of the money saved by reducing coal
output in creating jobs in “coal country” geared toward producing other
forms of energy, such as renewable wind and solar power. 43
Emerson compares the Clean Power Rule with the Obama Administra-
tion’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program (pp. 198–
201). DACA was announced as a matter of the secretary of homeland securi-
ty’s “prosecutorial” discretion to choose to defer action on deportation of in-
dividuals who were brought to the United States as children and who met
other criteria that would make them low priorities for use of deportation re-
sources. 44 Emerson criticizes this action because it was taken without any
41. Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page from Health Care Act, Obama Climate
Plan Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03
/us/politics/obama-epa-rule-coal-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html [https://perma.cc/EJ6P-
W27B].
42. Joshua Rhodes, Is the US Coal Industry Completely Burned Out?, FORBES (Feb. 12,
2020, 11:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuarhodes/2020/02/12/is-the-us-coal-
industry-almost-completely-burned-out/ [https://perma.cc/22DF-Q96P] (“[C]oal has largely
fallen out of favor for electricity production as price declines in natural gas and, to a lesser ex-
tent, renewables have made it harder for coal plants to make money in electricity markets. The
average US coal plant is now over 40 years old, and there is not a single commercial coal plant
under construction in the country. Some scenarios have coal generation remaining flat for the
next couple of decades, but most market fundamentals and societal goals indicate further de-
clines.”); The Clean Power Plan, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/CUX4-ZZBG].
43. Emerson’s assertion that the Trump Administration would have difficulty repealing
the Clean Power Plan warrants some criticism. The assertion was not premised on Emerson’s
underlying argument that deeply deliberative rulemaking processes are more likely to accurate-
ly reveal the public’s will. Instead, it was predicated on the fact that the rule would have to go
through drawn out notice-and-comment procedures to be reversed, which says nothing about
the superiority of his deeply deliberative procedures for ascertaining the public’s will. In fact,
that the Trump Administration was willing and able to overcome the barriers to amending the
Plan provides some indication that the deliberative procedures used to adopt it initially did not
indicate overwhelming public support for the plan. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emis-
sion Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units;
Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
44. The precise criteria laid out in Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s
DACA memorandum specified that
individuals could apply for deferred action if they had come to the U.S. before their
16th birthday; were under age 31; had continuously resided in the United States since
June 15, 2007; and were in school, graduated or had obtained a certificate of completion
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public participatory procedures. Emerson noted that President Trump could
easily repeal the program simply by having the secretary announce a change
in prosecutorial priorities (p. 201). But DACA proved somewhat resilient to
President Trump’s efforts to undo it. Emerson is correct that Trump’s secre-
tary of homeland security could have rescinded the program if she gave ade-
quate reasons for doing so. By many accounts, Trump did not want his
administration to go on record as seeking to deport undocumented immi-
grants who were brought to the United States as children because polls
showed that far more Americans favored DACA than opposed it. 45 So in-
stead of simply disagreeing with the value judgment—that providing DACA
recipients security against deportation for three years was the best use of
agency resources—Acting Secretary Elaine Duke reasoned that the original
DACA policy was beyond Secretary Napolitano’s legal authority. 46 In June of
2020, the Supreme Court reversed Secretary Duke’s termination of the pro-
gram, holding that the secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious be-
cause it failed to adequately consider options other than rescission of the
entire program and the reliance interests of DACA recipients. 47 In essence,
contrary to Emerson’s suggestion, DACA currently remains operational pre-
cisely because the Obama Administration assessed the will of the people ac-
curately enough that the Trump Administration decided against taking
responsibility for making a contrary value judgment. Thus, despite the lack
of deep deliberatively democratic processes, it seems that the Obama Ad-
ministration did accurately assess the public’s will.
Even if the agency presents the trade-offs of various potential regula-
tions fairly and accurately, it is unlikely that general members of the public
will take the time and effort to get involved in debating whether those trade-
offs are good or bad. If a regulatory outcome would hurt many people in a
manner that is not great, but would benefit a few people to a momentous ex-
tent, then those few people have a much greater incentive to get involved in
the burdensome regulatory procedure that Emerson advocates than do the
from high school, obtained a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, or
were an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the Unit-
ed States. Significantly, individuals were ineligible if they had been convicted of a felony
or a significant misdemeanor, but were considered eligible even if they had been con-
victed of up to two other misdemeanors.
Fact Sheet: Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/fact-sheet-rescission-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/7HKT-U73T].
45 . See Karlyn Bowman & Eleanor O’Neil, Public Opinion and DACA: What Do the
Polls Say?, AM. ENTER. INST.: AEIDEAS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.aei.org/politics-and-
public-opinion/polls/public-opinion-and-daca-what-do-the-polls-say/ [https://perma.cc/6L7A
-AWCF].
46. Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-
rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/WG7M-87A3].
47. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1911–13
(2020).
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multitudes who are marginally affected. 48 In addition, because they are fewer
in number, each of those few who stand to benefit are less likely to be free
riders on the efforts of others, and the direct costs of coordinating a cam-
paign to promote the regulation in a coordinated fashion is much smaller
than the cost of trying to coordinate the efforts of the millions who would be
hurt by the regulation. 49 In this scenario, those with a concentrated interest
will be much more willing and often more able to participate in the kind of
proceeding Emerson has in mind than are those with diffuse interests. The
likely outcome, if the agency is to defer to expressions of support by the pub-
lic, is that those with diffuse interests will not get their preferred regulatory
outcome, even though that outcome might better comport with the desires
of a supermajority of the public.
Emerson seems well aware of this well-known problem that plagues any
approach that requires collective action by groups of individuals. His re-
sponse is that administrators should therefore give more weight to the voice
of the larger group of individuals who are affected but may not have had the
incentives or means to participate in the rulemaking in a meaningful fashion
(p. 173). Emerson, however, never explains what it means to give more
weight to some comments over others: he never specifies how much more
weight to add, or even a mechanism that would instruct the agency how to
go about figuring how much weight to add in any particular context. This is
clearly a recipe for arbitrary decisionmaking. To illustrate why, think of the
agency, open-mindedly considering the input from all stakeholders, trying to
come up with a regulation that works better for all than proposals currently
on the table. As I already argued, the input of the general public is unlikely to
lead to suggestion of a creative new regulatory possibility. 50 The agency is
left to balance the interests in the various regulatory approaches. Giving
more weight to the interests of the larger group essentially means choosing
its preferred regulation even if, on balance, the arguments show that the oth-
er approach is better for the public interest. There is no way, however, for the
agency to explain how much weight it should add, because if there were, this
would be part of the calculation of which choice best serves the public inter-
est. The agency is then left with carte blanche to decide how much weight to
add to this group’s preferred outcome. One might read Emerson as merely
calling for the agency not to ignore the comments of the masses just because
they may be less well crafted or sophisticated. That is, the agency should give
serious consideration to the relevant input from all groups. But this already
48 . Cf . Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127, 190
(“[E]normous potential compliance costs of regulation provide greater incentives to business
for lobbying activities than the diffuse benefits of regulation provide to the general public.”).
49 . See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 66–97 (1965) (discussing various impediments to collective action).
50 . See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
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is a requirement of hard-look review’s focus on technical considerations,
which Emerson finds problematic. 51
Interest groups provide a potential institutional means of enabling pub-
lic deliberation. Dewey in particular viewed “ ‘para-state’ institutions, such as
trade and professional associations, unions, universities, charitable founda-
tions, religious organizations, advocacy groups and research centers . . . [as
mediators] between the interests of the isolated individual and the broader
national community” (p. 88). Such interest groups might refine the presenta-
tion of the interests of their members and communicate members’ concerns
to the agency in a sophisticated manner. 52 Because they aggregate the inter-
ests of their members, they have a greater incentive to participate actively in
agency proceedings and even might invest in the expertise to question agen-
cy analyses and hence more effectively represent members’ interests in the
regulatory process. 53 Reciprocally, interest groups can generate and focus
discussion among members, essentially communicating to them the likely
effects of regulation and generating discussion among members about their
regulatory preferences. Interest-group representatives also may be less di-
rectly affected by regulatory action. 54 Such distance might make these repre-
sentatives more open-minded to considering others’ perspectives on a
regulatory issue. Emerson does not unequivocally endorse this use of interest
groups, but his precise words regarding giving more weight to diffuse inter-
ests suggest that he sees such groups as the means by which the public will
participate in his deliberative process. 55
Interest groups, however, are not a panacea for the ills of the regulatory
process. Some groups may represent extreme views that they know the agen-
cy will not condone via its regulatory choices. These groups often participate
merely to disrupt the rulemaking process. 56 Interest groups may be struc-
tured in various ways, and that structure can have a profound impact on
how accurately the group represents its members’ interests. 57 Public interest
groups tend to be created by policy entrepreneurs, who must overcome the
barriers to collective action faced by groups whose members share a diffuse
51. P. 177–78; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (concluding that a court reviewing agency action must consider “whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors”).
52 . See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 476–85 (2005) (reporting that agencies are more likely to respond to sophisticated
comments).
53. Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV.
1300, 1315–16 (2016).
54 . See id . at 1331.
55. Pp. 172–76.
56 . See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis
for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 442 (2000) (“[U]nreasonable action by an
extreme group can work to its advantage by undermining the collaborative process on which
more mainstream groups rely to deliver material benefits.”).
57 . See generally Seifter, supra note 53.
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interest. These entrepreneurs maximize the groups’ influence by creating
mass-membership groups with many passive but dues-paying members. 58
Members join such a group because they agree with the positions espoused
in literature distributed by the group. But they do not expect to change those
positions by discussion with other members. They may get a newsletter de-
scribing group activity, but they are unlikely to deliberate about the regulato-
ry positions the group takes in the administrative process, much less
influence those positions. If a member does not like the action a group takes,
they simply let their membership lapse. 59 The interest of the entrepreneur
who formed the group may diverge from those of its members because the
group leader will have an interest in maximizing their personal power by en-
suring that they remain the leader of the group and that the group attracts a
large number of members. For instance, to attract members to join a group,
a leader may have the group take extreme salient actions that are almost cer-
tain not to result in agency policies that benefit its members, but that will at-
tract attention to the group and thereby increase membership. 60 On the
whole, public-interest groups may make some public deliberation about reg-
ulatory issues tractable, but the deliberation they generate is unlikely to be
the deeply democratic process that Emerson envisions.
Emerson might object that my critique of the general public’s ability to
deliberate about regulatory actions reflects agencies’ focus on technical ar-
guments, about which the general public can add little. Rather, Emerson as-
serts, agencies should focus on the values of the public, 61 and base those on
the experiences of various members of the public as revealed via deep-
deliberative processes. But this argument ignores one of Hegel’s basic prem-
ises for giving administrators discretion—which is that administrators are in
a position to translate the broad universal prescriptions of statutes into the
context-specific universal regulations that take into account the particular
circumstances within which regulations operate. 62 This is a crucial point be-
cause individuals do not simply act in accordance with a single value. Rather,
they hold multiple values that often compete with each other to determine
their preferences regarding outcomes in particular circumstances. What
Judge Frank Easterbrook said of statutes is just as true of the preferences of
regulatory stakeholders: they are vectors, not rays. 63 Stakeholders do not
58 . See Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 307 (2005).
59 . See Seifter, supra note 53, at 1338–46 (discussing how different structures for inter-
action between group leaders and members may undermine group representation of members’
interests); Seidenfeld, supra note 56, at 427–39 (discussing “[p]athologies in [p]ublic [i]nterest
[g]roup [d]ynamics” that can affect the efficacy and legitimacy of interest group participation
in regulatory proceedings).
60. Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 4, at 1438.
61 . See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
62 . See supra text accompanying note 28.
63. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988).
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pursue one value at the expense of all others but rather pursue a value until
the trade-off with other values they hold becomes more important than fur-
ther pursuit of the value that, in the abstract, the regulation seeks to advance.
Let’s return to the secretary of homeland security’s adoption of the
DACA program to illustrate this point. Undoubtedly there is a large segment
of the American population that believes that undocumented immigrants
should not be allowed to remain in the United States. 64 Given Trump’s elec-
toral victory based in large part on his stance on limiting immigration, 65
perhaps one can ascribe to this large segment of the population a belief that
that immigrants compete for jobs that otherwise would be given to Ameri-
cans and a value judgment that Americans should come first. One might
conclude that a person harboring that value would oppose DACA. But, there
is a potentially countervailing value at play—that individuals should be
treated fairly and not penalized for actions beyond their control. Undocu-
mented children brought to this country illegally almost without exception
were not responsible for the decision to enter the United States. Some DACA
recipients have really known only the United States as their country and,
based on the DACA criteria, have been lawful and contributing members of
their community. Thus, merely specifying an individual’s values will not in-
dicate whether the individual is likely to support or oppose DACA.
Moreover, common experience of how individuals decide which regula-
tory provisions they support or oppose suggest that individuals do not iden-
tify all of their values, try to put a measure of importance on each, and then
balance them to determine what outcomes they prefer. Rather, in everyday
matters individuals evaluate how various outcomes would affect their lives
and base their regulatory preferences on that experiential evaluation. In oth-
er words, for most regulatory debates, outcome preferences reveal individu-
als’ values; abstract values do not explicitly drive preferences. I do not mean
to suggest that a person’s values do not influence their choices. 66 In fact,
people may adopt values to simplify having to figure out “the right thing to
do” when making everyday decisions. 67 But values don’t determine regulato-
64 . Immigration, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx [https://
perma.cc/SZ62-GYTK].
65 . See Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and Now, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/31/us/politics/donald-
trump-immigration-changes.html [https://perma.cc/Q9FW-MJCE]; Philip Klinkner, Opinion,
Yes, Trump’s Hard-Line Immigration Stance Helped Him Win the Election—But It Could Be His
Undoing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
klinker-immigration-election-20170417-story.html [https://perma.cc/35AC-65QS].
66 . See, e .g ., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Value Orientation and the Law, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 475, 479 (2017) (“Values play a critical role in influencing actions and in shap-
ing the structure and content of the law.”).
67. The term “values” is often associated with notions of morality and virtue. See, e .g .,
Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Mo-
rality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1119–23 (1999).
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ry preferences in any exact predictable manner, 68 and treating individual’s
identification of their values, even after deliberation, as a basis for resolving
regulatory questions therefore is likely to lead to outcomes that do not truly
reflect the public’s will. 69
I need to be clear here that I am not claiming that regulatory decisions
are value neutral. The outcomes chosen by regulators certainly reflect a
judgement about how to balance particular distinct values. My point is that
the best way to reveal the precise values inherent in regulation in a manner
that can be understood and evaluated by the public is for the agency to clear-
ly identify the effects of various policies and thereby the trade-offs in out-
comes from choosing one regulation over alternatives. And once
understood, individuals can factor agency value judgements into their politi-
cal choices. 70
B. Agency Staff Are Not Appropriate for the Role Emerson Asks Them to Fill
This can lead to potential agency abuse of its administrative power. Re-
call that Hegel posited that government bureaucrats were well suited for
adopting regulations that would secure his notion of freedom, which was the
obligation of the state. He reasoned that, by virtue of working for the gov-
ernment, they were public spirited and did not have a personal stake in the
matters they decided. They also were part of the educated class, and thus
were trained to think rationally and deliberate when making decisions. 71
Progressives such as Dewey and Follett added the requirement that staff ob-
tain direct public input of information as a key to the democratic bona fides
of the administrative state. 72 It is crucial to recognize that Emerson sees the
bureaucracy playing a role of facilitating deliberation by the general public,
rather than engaging in deliberation itself (p. 151).
Who are these staff members that Emerson expects can facilitate public
deliberation? They are chemists, biologists, health scientists, engineers, ac-
countants, and other individuals who are trained in particular disciplines
that may bear on finding facts and predicting the outcomes from regulatory
68 . Cf . Thomas M. Madden, Law and Strategy and Ethics?, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 181,
187 (2019) (“[M]any, if not all, ethical decisions are made at least first nonconsciously or pre-
rationally.”).
69. I do not mean to suggest that there are never questions that require a discussion of
values in choosing appropriate regulatory outcomes. There are some determinations of out-
comes that are inherently uncertain, and for which the best prediction of outcomes will not be
determinable based on technical reasoning. If the agency has no objective basis to believe one
prediction is better than the other, it ultimately will have to make a determination based on
underlying values. Even then, however, the need to explicitly reveal the value choice is driven
by the need to make a prediction of regulatory outcomes, not because the agency should
choose which values best reflect those shared by the public.
70 . See Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 4, at 1413–14 (describing criteria people
use when voting for president).
71 . See supra text following note 7.
72 . See supra notes 15–23 and accompanying text.
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alternatives. 73 They generally have no special skill in encouraging delibera-
tion or in evaluating inputs from the public to divine some overarching pub-
lic value to guide regulation. They certainly lay no special claim to
understanding how agency regulation is likely to rectify asymmetrical social
relationships to empower participation by those marginalized by society, let
alone how to balance that consideration against the will of the public. 74 Yet
Emerson trusts that they will be capable of such encouragement, divination,
and empowerment.
One might believe that agencies’ relationships to the politically account-
able branches can ensure sufficient incentive for the agency bureaucrats to
take the concerns of various stakeholders seriously. Although this is not the
position Emerson takes, it is one that has motivated other justifications for
the administrative state. 75 The Constitution makes it clear that outside the
few powers directly bestowed on the president by that document, the execu-
tive branch is subject to limitation by Congress through the enactment of
limiting statutes and by budgetary constraints that flow from Congress’s
power of the purse. But, scholars conventionally have agreed that “once
Congress made [broad] delegations [to the executive], it could not, or at the
least did not, exercise any effective control over administrative policymak-
ing.” 76 The inability of Congress to sufficiently monitor and correct adminis-
trative missteps has gotten even worse recently due to the extreme
partisanship of the political branches. 77
The other politically accountable institution specified by the Constitu-
tion is the president. Emerson, however, seems to reject granting the presi-
dent a role in reviewing agency regulations. He notes: “[T]he president’s
constitutional prerogatives and budgetary supervision [already] allow him or
her to direct, constrain, and otherwise influence agency action to a greater
extent than Congress” (p. 194). In addition, unlike Congress, the president
does not “face the same costs of reaching binding decisions” (p. 183). Thus,
the president has enormous power to influence regulation, even the power to
73 . See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique
of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 303–04 (2009) (noting that for substantial rulemaking
efforts, a team of agency staff is usually responsible for developing regulations); Thomas O.
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991,
at 57, 92–94 (describing the team model of rulemaking).
74 . See Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 4, at 1443–44 (“[A]s apolitical experts,
agencies are not trained in sorting out and evaluating the strength of the values of different
groups within the polity . . . .”).
75 . See, e .g ., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–45
(2001) (arguing that presidential control of administration is justified by effectiveness and ac-
countability); Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 4, at 1550–54.
76. Kagan, supra note 75, at 2256.
77 . See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 12 (2006); see also Gilli-
an E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1748 (2015)
(asserting that extreme political polarization has rendered “Congress . . . unable to direct agen-
cies through enactment of substantive legislation”).
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control the substance of administrative action. The president, however, is a
political being, and it is not in the nature of the president to act deliberative-
ly. Rather, the president has every incentive to aggrandize his or her personal
power. Thus, by Emerson’s account, “calls to bolster presidential control,
and the strong proclivity of presidents to do so . . . represent a real threat to
the deliberative integrity of the American administrative state” (p. 183).
While Emerson’s skepticism about calls to aggrandize presidential pow-
er over agency action may be justified, he seems to have gone to the opposite
extreme of eliminating the president entirely from the administrative pro-
cess. The role of the president in Emerson’s administrative state, other than
vetoing legislation, would primarily be in selecting the heads of agencies re-
sponsible for making the ultimate regulatory decisions. 78 But election of the
president surely must have more significance than just choosing who ap-
points agency heads. In particular, suppose that the agency has engaged in a
truly deliberative process and decided to adopt a regulation that the presi-
dent believes does not accurately reflect the will of the people. It would seem
that, once deliberation occurs to identify the values at stake, the decision
about what values to promote over others is uniquely political and that the
president is the most legitimate entity to make that decision. 79
The institution to which Emerson turns to constrain administrative pol-
icymaking discretion is the courts. But recall that Emerson proposes that
administrators explicitly discuss the values of those affected by regulation
and determine some common values of the public in order to reach regulato-
ry decisions. Values, however, are often impossible to argue in a logical
sense. 80 One can try to convince individuals that they should modify their
values in light of the outcomes to which those values lead or the experiences
that others in the community can describe. But often there will be no right or
wrong answers. 81 In short, how values play out in influencing regulation is
often a political question rather than one that can be derived by logical ar-
gument from accepted legal sources and principles. This is the reason it
seems perverse for Emerson to call for a group of technical experts to deter-
mine the essence of the public’s values. But, it is even more bizarre to turn to
the courts—the branch of government intentionally shielded to the greatest
extent from political influence—to check the agency determination of the
will of the public.
Rust v . Sullivan 82 is a Supreme Court decision that reveals the problems
with having courts review agency appeals of decisions predicated on abstract
values to justify regulatory actions. Rust involved a challenge to the Reagan
Administration’s regulations reinterpreting Title X of the Public Health Ser-
78 . See pp. 181–83.
79 . See Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 4, at 1443–44.
80 . See, e .g ., ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(1969) (describing irreducible tensions among various values).
81 . Id .
82. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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vice Act, which provides funds for family-planning services. 83 Title X pro-
vided that none of the funds allocated for such services “shall be used in pro-
grams where abortion is a method of family planning.”84 For the first
seventeen years after Title X was enacted, it was interpreted to allow a fami-
ly-planning clinic receiving federal funds to discuss abortion as an option for
a pregnant woman who did not want to have a child and to refer a woman
who chose to terminate their pregnancy to a facility that would perform the
abortion. 85 The new interpretation, euphemistically known as the “gag rule,”
prohibited family planning clinics receiving Title X funds from counseling
anyone about abortion as an option for a pregnant woman. 86
The Court applied the Chevron doctrine and found that the statute was
ambiguous at step one. 87 At step two, it upheld the secretary of health and
human services’ reasoning that “the new regulations are more in keeping
with the original intent of the statute, are justified by client experience under
the prior policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude against the ‘elimina-
tion of unborn children by abortion.’ ” 88 Essentially, at step two, the court de-
ferred to the secretary’s determination that the values held by the public had
moved to oppose abortion.
This is problematic for several reasons. First, indicative of the problems
with relying on values, there was no objective means for the agency to sup-
port this assertion. Second, even if the agency determination about the val-
ues held by the American polity was correct, it ignored the fact that many
poor pregnant women do not have any source of medical care other than Ti-
tle X clinics and that women for whom carrying a pregnancy to term posed a
significant risk of death would never be informed that they were risking their
lives by not terminating their pregnancies. Commenters noted that under
the gag rule Title X programs could not even mention that delaying having
an abortion raises the health risks for the pregnant women. 89 In terms of
predicted outcomes, the new regulation almost certainly would have de-
creased the number of abortions, but also almost certainly would have in-
creased the number of women who died in childbirth or from delaying
termination of their pregnancies. In terms of values, this changes the picture
because many individuals who oppose abortion generally also believe that a
woman should be able to obtain an abortion when her life or subsequent
83 . Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
84 . Id .
85 . Id . at 186 (accepting the contention in petitioner’s brief that prior regulations al-
lowed nondirective counseling and referral for abortion).
86 . Id . at 179–80.
87 . Id . at 184–86.
88 . Id . at 187 (emphasis added).
89 . See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 110 (1994).
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health are at stake. 90 The agency did not try to find the balance between
these two values, which in light of the nature of values left the Court no op-
tion but to find the agency determination of values to be reasonable.
By reviewing what Emerson calls the technicalities of agency action,
courts would force the agency to make abundantly clear the value judgments
inherent in its actions. 91 For example, as I see the purpose of judicial review,
the Rust Court should have remanded for the secretary of health and human
services to estimate the decrease in the number of abortions likely to result
from the gag order, but also the increase in deaths from at-risk women car-
rying their pregnancies to term or delaying termination of their pregnancies.
The agency should also have discussed the psychological impact on a woman
of choosing to terminate her pregnancy and also the likely effect of an un-
wanted child on the future life of the mother. This would render explicit the
balance of values that the agency decision reflected and would facilitate ef-
forts by various interest groups to keep the agency honest about the trade-
offs that it considers beneficial to society.
Judicial review that forces the agency to reveal the policy trade-offs in-
herent in its regulatory judgment—that is, the value judgment underlying its
regulatory decision—therefore would facilitate public evaluation of whether
the agency action was justified. Such review would make transparent any at-
tempt by an administration to “spin” the facts and predicted outcomes to in-
duce the public inappropriately to favor regulation that the president might
prefer for purely political reasons. 92 Once the regulatory trade-offs are accu-
rately identified, Congress or the president—the democratically accountable
institutions of government—have incentives to step in to constrain the agen-
cy if either feels sufficiently concerned by the public reaction to the agency’s
choice of values. Were the president to order or otherwise express a clear de-
sire that an agency take a specific regulatory action before the agency identi-
fies the regulatory trade-offs, communication of the president’s preferred
regulatory action is likely to bias the agency factfinding and predictions in
favor of the president’s preferred regulation, 93 essentially undermining de-
liberation about the predicted effects of such regulation. Hence, in such a
90 . See Maria Caspani, Support for Abortion Rights Grows as Some U .S . States Curb Ac-
cess, REUTERS (May 26, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-abortion-
poll/support-for-abortion-rights-grows-as-some-us-states-curb-access-reuters-ipsos-poll-
idUSKCN1SW0CD [https://perma.cc/L8U2-86R3].
91. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 160 (2012) (arguing that hard look “allow[s] those interested in the deci-
sion to understand the trade-offs inherent in the agency’s value choices without having to in-
vest greatly in educating themselves about the technical details of the subject of regulation”).
92 . Id .
93. Agency staff would be biased toward the regulation suggested by the president by
failing to credit or even look for evidence disconfirming the benefits of that regulation, as well
as evaluating the hypothetical benefits in contexts that might mask effects of other factors. See
Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemak-
ing, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 504 (2002) (discussing how confirmation bias might affect agency
evaluation of proposed rules).
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situation, a reviewing court should look especially carefully at the record and
the agency reasoning to ensure that it truly can reasonably justify the action.
Emerson seems to doubt that courts are capable of reviewing technical
aspects of agency decisions because those decisions depend on very special-
ized knowledge and experience that judges do not have. 94 Hard-look review,
however, does not call for judges to make technical decisions. Judges only
need to decide whether the agency has adequately identified policy trade-offs
sufficiently to show that the agency considered all factors bearing on, and
perspectives raised by, the regulatory issue. 95 As one who studied physics be-
fore going to law school, my experience leads me to believe that someone
who really understands the technical basis for a decision can explain that ba-
sis in terms that are accessible to intelligent and motivated individuals even
if those individuals are not trained in the technical field. And courts provide
the ideal institution to perform such review. First, judges are trained in law,
and virtually everyone in the legal academy acknowledges that law schools
focus on teaching their students to think critically. 96 What that means is that
lawyers often excel in finding gaps in reasoning and weaknesses in support
for arguments. And agency explanations for their actions are really argu-
ments for why the agency acted as it did. Moreover, if under hard-look re-
view (or step two of Chevron) a court issues a decision that the agency
believes demonstrates that the court did not understand the agency justifica-
tions, the agency can take the same action and explain precisely what the
court did not understand. 97 I feel much more comfortable having the courts
review technical arguments than I do having them decide whether the values
of the public coincide with those the agency credited. In fact, I would advo-
cate that courts should not give extra deference to an agency determination
that the agency claims to be predicated upon technicalities that the courts
cannot hope to fully understand. Such invocations seem more likely to be an
94. Emerson criticizes the approach to judicial review as “extremely costly for agencies
to offer, beyond courts’ institutional competency to assess, and inscrutable to any member of
the public without a graduate degree in the relevant subject matter.” Pp. 177–78.
95 . See Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1743, 1752 (2019) (describing aggressive review under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard as requiring courts to carefully scrutinize agency action to ensure the agency “ade-
quately considered all relevant factors, and provided thoroughly reasoned explanations to sup-
port their actions”).
96 . See, e .g ., Kevin Yamamoto, Banning Laptops in the Classroom: Is It Worth the Has-
sles?, 57 J. LEG. EDUC. 477, 489 (2007) (“In law school we teach a method of thinking, often
called ‘thinking like a lawyer’ or critical thinking, that involves looking at a set of facts and ap-
plying the law to those facts, putting the rule into a broader construct, and analyzing a problem
from start to finish.”).
97 . See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Re-
view Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2000) (concluding that hard-look review does not
“significantly impede agencies in pursuit of their policy goals”).
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attempt to hide predictions and factfinding that the agency cannot justify ra-
ther than an accurate description of the reality of judicial competence. 98
CONCLUSION
The Public’s Law recounts a Progressive tradition of administrative law,
influenced by Hegel and dedicated to a democratic and participatory admin-
istrative state. It goes on to suggest a “normative architecture” by which the
government could implement the shared will of the public as determined by
deliberative democratic processes in which each person participates as an
equal. Although I applaud Emerson’s ultimate vision, unfortunately it re-
mains to be demonstrated that public deliberation is capable of performing
the task that the Progressive tradition asks of it.
98. Thus, for example, I find problematic the decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co . v .
National Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), in which the Court deferred to the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission’s prediction that a repository for spent nuclear fuel that would
isolate the biosphere from release of the radioactive material would be found. Id . at 94–95. The
NRC admitted the uncertainty of its prediction and gave no explanation for why it believed
that such a site could be found, but the Court credited the prediction, noting that the Court
will be most deferential to “predictions, within [the agencies] area of special expertise, at the
frontiers of science.” Id . at 103. Today, forty-two years later, no site has yet been found on
which to build a long-term storage facility for nuclear waste. See Rob Nikolewski, Trump Takes
Yucca Mountain off the Table . What’s that Mean for San Onofre Nuclear Waste?, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-02-07/trump-yucca-mountain-
san-onofre-nuclear-waste [https://perma.cc/NYA8-WUVV].
